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INTRODUCTION

Consider, for a moment. the challenges faced by two police officers injured
in the line of duty. The first, Officer Andrews, is a beat cop with Patrol Team
Two of the Charleston Police Department. Officer Andrews, while on his beat,

1. The examples of Detectives Andrews and Baker are hypothetical and are intended to
illustrate the flaws in South Carolina's approach to determining compensability for psychological
injuries.
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observes a purse-snatcher stealing a young lady's handbag. He chases after the
thief but falls and breaks his wrist while pursuing the miscreant down a flight of
stairs. Consequently, Officer Andrews needs surgery to repair his wrist, and he
misses two weeks of work. The Charleston Police Department's workers'
compensation insurance paid for his medical expenses and lost wages, and he
eventually returns to his post as good as new.
The second officer. Detective Baker, is an undercover officer with the
Organized Crime and Narcotics Team of the Columbia Police Department.
During a sting operation, Detective Baker's cover is blown. A firefight ensues,
during which Detective Baker is forced to shoot and kill an assailant in selfdefense. Detective Baker suffers no physical injuries, but in the weeks that
follow the shooting, he suffers from anxiety, depression, and flashbacks. He is
eventually diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder, and his
psychiatrist concludes that he is unable to continue working. Because Detective
Baker's injuries are psychological and because they arose from conditions that
South Carolina does not consider to be "extraordinary or unusual" 2 to his
employment, he is unable to claim workers' compensation benefits. Detective
Baker never returns to work and is forced to go on Social Security Disability.
Is this a just result? This Note makes the case that it is not. Part 11 is an
examination of the history and purposes of workers' compensation statutes. Part
III surveys the four primary approaches that states have taken in determining
compensability for psychological injuries. Next, Part IV argues that South
Carolina's approach to this issue is flawed because it unnecessarily distinguishes
between physical injuries and psychological injuries, resulting in substantial

hardship on workers whose psychological injuries are no less devastating than
the physical injuries suffered by their peers. Part V examines alternative
methods of determining compensability that South Carolina policymakers might
consider, while Part VI explores the different methods legislators, judges, and
lawyers might employ to remedy this issue. Finally, Part VII concludes this

Note.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF WORKERS" COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES

First, an examination of the history and purposes of workers' compensation
statutes will be helpful in evaluating the current rules of compensability for
psychological injuries.

2.

Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448. 458. 535 S.E.2d 438. 443 (2000).
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Adoption and Implementation of Workers' Compensation

At common law, workers who suffered injuries arising out of the course of
their employment were entirely barred from recovering against their employers.3
Although employees theoretically were entitled to relief through common law
actions for torts, three doctrines-assumption of the risk, contributory
negligence, and common employment-served to deny employees from
successfully asserting causes of action for negligence against their employers. 4
As the industrial revolution lurched into the twentieth century, it brought about a
dramatic increase in the number of workers injured on the job and a concomitant
dissatisfaction with the lack of remedies for these injuries.5 State legislatures
responded by abandoning the concept of fault entirely 6 and predicating liability
on the risk inherent to employment in general."
The resulting statutes-now effective in every state -strike a bargain
between employees and employers: employees give up their right to common
law causes of action and the attendant right to traditional measures of damages,
and in return, they receive compensation for all injuries incurred in the scope of
their employment. 9 In exchange for accepting no-fault liability, employers are
spared the costs of litigation and the unpredictability of damages from
negligence verdicts.10 The measure of compensation is limited to two costs-(1)
medical expenses related to the injury11 and (2) lost earnings, usually determined
by a schedule.'1 Though each state has tweaked the details of its system over the
past century, these general mechanics remain in place today.

3. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 777 (1982).
4.
Id. at 776.
5.

See, e.g., PHILIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

§ 2.8

(4th ed. 2011)

(noting that workers' compensation law was a response to increased workplace injuries and the lack
of legal remedies); I TERRY A. MOORE. ALABAMA WORKERS'

COMPENSATION

§

1:1 (1998)

(explaining that the Alabama workers' compensation statute was the product of "the harsh realities
of industrialization and the inadequacies of the common-law system").
6.
FULTON, supra note 5, § 1.2 (citing Couch v. Thomas, 497 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985), abrogated by Eberly v. A-P Controls, Inc.. 572 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio 1991)).
7.
Id. (quoting State ex rel. Munding v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 111 N.E. 299, 303 (Ohio
1915). overruled in part by State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 143 NE. 574 (Ohio
1924)).
8.
See 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 2.08 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2012).
9.
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 192-96 (1917) (citations omitted)
(discussing the mechanics of New York's workers' compensation statute).
10. See id. at 196-97 (comparing common arguments for and against the then-new statutory
scheme).
11. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60 (1976 & Supp. 2012) (providing that the employer must
pay medical expenses as may reasonably be required).
12. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-10 (1976 & Supp. 2012) (providing that the employer must
pay the injured employee two-thirds of his weekly salary during the total disability).
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B. The Purposes of T orkers' Compensation
In examining the history of workers' compensation statutes, judges and
scholars have identified a core group of purposes that motivated the adoption of
these schemes across the country: (1) "provid[ing] shelter to employees and to
their families 'from the various hardships that result from employment-related
injuries"'; 1' (2) protecting employers from "the unpredictable nature and expense
of litigation"; 14 and (3) "cast[ing] upon the industry in which [employees] are
employed a share of the burden resulting from industrial accidents."
Similarly,
the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission has recognized a
corresponding group of objectives that underlie the system in South Carolina:
[(1)] Provide sure, prompt, and reasonable income and medical benefits
to work-related accident victims, or income benefits to their dependents,
regardless of fault;
[(2)] Provide a single remedy and reduce court delays, costs, and
judicial workloads arising out of personal injury litigation;

[(3)] Relieve public and private charities of financial demands incident
to uncompensated occupational accidents;
[(4)] Minimize payment of fees to lawyers and witnesses as well as
time-consuming trials and court appeals;
[(5)] Encourage maximum employer interest in safety and rehabilitation
through an appropriate experience-rating mechanism; and
[(6)] Promote frank study of the causes of accidents (rather than
concealment of fault) in an effort to reduce preventable accidents and
human suffering.16
Additionally, in South Carolina, as in many states, "compensation laws [are]
given a liberal construction in furtherance of [these] beneficent purposes ... so
as to avoid incongruous or harsh results."

13. Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing Home, 760 A.2d 663, 675 (Md. 2000) (quoting Martin
v. Beverage Capital Corp., 726 A.2d 728. 733 (Md. 1999)).
14. Id. (quoting Polomski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 684 A.2d 1338, 1341 (Md.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-40-102 (2012) (noting the
legislature's desire to avoid litigation in establishing the workers' compensation statute): N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (LexisNexis 2004) (noting the legislature's consideration of employer costs in
establishing the workers' compensation statute).
15. Taylor v. Mount Vernon-Woodberry Mills, 211 S.C. 414, 422, 45 S.E.2d 809, 812
(1947).
16. 2003-2004 S.C. WORKERS' COMIP. COMM'N A-NN\. REP. 1 [hereinafter A-NN\. REP.].
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Throughout the country and in South Carolina, courts refer to these Nurposes
of workers' compensation when interpreting relevant legislative acts.
Some
statutes explicitly require the courts to construe the statutes liberally in order to
achieve these purposes. 19 In examining South Carolina's compensability rules, it
is necessary to refer back to these purposes in deciding whether the current
rule-the "extraordinary or unusual circumstances"20 requirement-is really in
the best interests of South Carolina workers and employers.

111. FOUR APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PSYCHOLOGICAL NJURIES
At the outset, it is important to identify and examine the various approaches
states have taken in determining compensability for psychological injuries.
Professor Larson, in his treatise on workers' compensation, identifies three kinds
of psychological injuries.
The first, termed "mental-physical," involves a
scenario where psychological stress in the workplace results in a physical
symptom of injury. ' Injuries of this type are universally considered to be
compensable.
The second, called "physical-mental," involves situations in
which a physical stimulus causes mental injury symptoms.24 As with the first
category, injuries of this type are also universally considered compensable.25
The third kind of psychological injury, called "mental-nental," involves cases in
which a mental stressor or stimulus results in mental symptoms.26 For this third
category, an "impressive majority" of courts support compensability; however, a
substantial minority of courts still deny compensation.
Although each state has taken its own approach in determining
compensability for these psychological injuries, the results can be gathered into
four general groups: (1) the "unusual or extraordinary circumstances"

17. Stokes v. First Nat'1 Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 22, 377 S.E.2d 922, 927 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Sligh v. Pac. Mills, 207 S.C. 316. 319, 35 S.E.2d 713, 713 (1945)), affd, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d
248 (1991).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White. 243 U.S. 188, 192-96 (1917) (citations omitted)
(discussing New York's workers' compensation statute); Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448, 455,
535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) (citing Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 306 S.C. 311, 316. 411 S.E.2d
672, 674 (Ct. App. 1991), af'd inpart,rev'd in part, 311 S.C. 218, 428 S.E.2d 700 (1993)) (noting
that the workers' compensation statute is liberally construed in furtherance of the "beneficial
purposes for which it was designed").
19. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.080 (LexisNexis 2010) (stating that all statutes
should be liberally construed "to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature").
20. See Shealv 341 S.C. at 458, 535 S.E.2d. at 443.
21. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 8, § 56.01.
22. Id. § 56.02[1].
23. Id.
24. Id. §56.03[1]
25. Id.
26. Id. § 56.04.
27. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 13
1068

SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 1063

requirement; (2) the sudden stimulus requirement; (3) the physical injury
causation requirement; and (4) the employment causation requirement.
4. The "Extraordinaryor Unusual Circumstances" Requirement
The first approach-and the one currently used in South Carolina-is the
"unusual or extraordinary circumstances" requirement. 8 The test requires the
stimulus that caused the injury to be "extraordinary and unusual in comparison to
the normal conditions of the particular employment." 29 This requirement is
distinguished from the others in that the "extraordinary or unusual"
circumstances need not involve a physical stimulus, nor do they need to occur
suddenly or be traceable to a single discernible event.31 In South Carolina, this
approach was first propounded in Stokes v. First National Bank.3 In Stokes, a
bank officer suffered a nervous breakdown shortly after a substantial increase in
3
his working hours and job responsibilities.
Searching for an analogue to
mental injuries from which to draw a legal standard for compensability, the court
of appeals adopted the rule applied to heart attack cases.34 The court of appeals
explained that it adopted the "extraordinary or unusual conditions" standard
because the courts in South Carolina had previously "likened mental
injur[ies] ... to heart attack[s]."" The statutory language that appears today was
a legislative ratification of this approach.
In some ways, the analogy used by the court of appeals makes sense. Both
heart conditions and mental injuries are susceptible to initiation or aggravation
by workplace stressors.
Additionally, and perhaps of greatest concern to the

28. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160(B)(1) (Supp. 2012).
29. Id
30. See id
31. See Stokes v. First Nat'1 Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 17-18, 377 S.E.2d 922, 924-25 (Ct. App.
1988) (citations omitted), aff'd, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991).
32. See id. However, the court in Stokes gave credit for the "new and ... enlightened rule" to
the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources
Department, 236 S.C. 540, 544, 115 S.E.2d 183. 186 (1960).
33. Id at 15-16, 377 S.E.2dat 923.
34. See id at 18 19, 377 S.E.2d at 925 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 18, 377 S.E.2d at 925.
36. See 1996 S.C. Acts 2566 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160(B)(1)
(Supp. 2012)).
37. See e.g., Bentley v. Spartanburg Cnty., 398 S.C. 418, 420-21, 730 S.E.2d 296, 297-98
(2012). reh'g denied (Aug. 10, 2012) (describing employee police officer's psychological
symptoms following his shooting a suspect while on patrol); Westbury v. Heslep & Thomason Co.,
199 S.C. 124, 130, 18 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1942) (explaining that testimony that victim of a heart
attack had not experienced symptoms prior to a fall at work could lead to a reasonable inference that
the heart attack was sustained as a result of the fall); Green v. City of Bennettsville, 197 S.C. 313,
328, 15 S.E.2d 334. 340-41 (1941) (holding that there was sufficient evidence that deceased
employee died of a heart attack as a result of the circumstances of his employment). For a
discussion of the compensability ofinjuries to which a preexisting condition contributed, see Sweatt
v. Mlarlboro Cotton Mills. 206 S.C. 476, 480, 34 S.E.2d 762. 763 (1945) (citing Cromer v.
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courts, both present knots of causative factors that are difficult for courts to
untangle. Requiring "extraordinary or unusual" conditions of employment for
compensability provides courts with a shortcut through this problem. If the
onset of an injury coincides with extraordinary or unusual conditions of
employment, courts reason that the conditions probably caused the injury; and if
no such coincidence was present, then internal factors, such as an underlying
condition, or nonemployment external factors, such as marital problems,
probably caused the injury.
B.

The Sudden Stimulus Requirement

The second approach-the sudden stimulus requirement-allows for
compensation without a physical stimulus, but only when the employee has
suffered a "sudden stimulus."3 9 Tennessee courts, for example, recognize "that a
mental stimulus, such as fright, shock or even excessive, unexpected anxiety
could amount to an 'accident' sufficient to justify an award for a resulting mental
or nervous disorder."40 Jurisdictions adopting this approach tend to focus on the
definition of the terms "accident" or "injury" as used in the statute.41 In these
jurisdictions, "accident" has been given a relatively narrow construction. For
example, Texas requires that the stimulus be "an undesigned, untoward event
that is traceable to a definite time, place, and cause" before allowing
compensation for a mental-mental injury.
Nevada is the exception, having adopted this approach by statute. Nevada
prohibits compensation for "[a]ny ailment or disorder caused by any gradual
mental stimulus."44 For an injury caused by stress to be compensable in Nevada.,
the employee must show "by clear and convincing medical or psychiatric
evidence" that the "mental injury [was] caused by extreme stress in time of
danger."4 5

Newberry Cotton Mills, 201 S.C. 349, 364, 23 S.E.2d 19. 25 (1942): Ferguson v. State Highway
Dep't, 197 S.C. 520, 527, 15 S.E.2d 775. 778 (1941): Cole v. State Highway Dep't. 190 S.C. 142.
147, 2 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1939)).
38. See, e.g., Westbury, 199 S.C. at 130, 18 S.E.2d at 671 (heart attack resulting from fall);
Green, 197 S.C. at 328, 15 S.E.2d at 340-41 (heart attack resulting from police officer's arrest of an
uncooperative suspect).
39. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 8, § 56.06[5].
40. Henley v. Roadway Express, 699 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting Jose v.
Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977)).
41. See, e.g., id. (quoting Jose, 556 SW.2d at 84) (discussing the term "accident" in the
Tennessee statute); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 SW.2d 334, 335-36 (Tex. 1979) (citations
omitted) (discussing Texas's construction of the terms "accidental injury" and "occupational
disease," as applied to a stress case).
42. Maksn. 580 S.W.2d at 336.
43. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 616C.180 (LexisNexis 2012).
44. Id. § 616C. 180(2).
45. Id. § 616C.180(3)(a).
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The common factor among the "sudden stimulus" jurisdictions is a statutory
construction that views employment-related injuries as the product of single
events, rather than general conditions of employment.
This narrowness is a
stark contrast from the broader definitions embraced in other states. 47 The
primary reason for this narrow construction is "apprehension about fraudulent
claims and the genuineness of the causal relation between employment and the
mental injury [compared to] cases in which . .. the causal stimulus is a traumatic

mental impact."

8

C. The Physical Injwy CausationRequirement
The third approach-the physical injury causation requirement-requires
claimants to demonstrate that their psychological injuries arise from a physical
injury to the body. 9 In states that have adopted this requirement, mental-mental
injuries are simply not recognized.so
Additionally, in some states,
compensability is expressly limited by statute, while in others, courts have
declined to construe ambiguous statutes in favor of compensating these injuries
absent a physical inj ury.52
Courts have suggested several rationales for this rule. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court declined to construe that state's ambiguous workers'
compensation statute in favor of compensability because it believed that doing so
would reallocate costs from health disability insurance to the workers'
compensation system.
The court felt such a reallocation was a "major policy
determination" and one it was unwilling to make absent clear intent of the

46. See, e.g., Henley, 699 S.W.2d at 155 (noting that "it must be shown that at the time and
place of the injury the employee was performing a duty he was employed to do"); Maksyn, 580
S.W.2d at 336 (explaining that an injury must be "traceable to a definite time, place, and cause").
47. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE 3208.3(b)(1) (West 2011) (providing that a psychiatric
injury will be compensable if an employee proves by a preponderance of the evidence "that actual
events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury");
MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that "[m]ental disabilities are
compensable if arising out of actual events of employment . . . and if the employee's perception of
the actual events is reasonably grounded in fact or reality").
48. Gatlin v. City of Knoxville, 822 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting Lawrence
Joseph, The Causation Issue in Wf'orkers' Compensation Mlental Disability Cases: An Analysis,
Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REv. 263, 291 n.113 (1983)).
49. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(9) (LexisNexis 2007) (specifying that "[i]njury does not
include a mental disorder or mental injury that has neither been produced nor been proximately
caused by some physical injury to the body"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C)(1) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2012) (limiting compensable psychiatric injuries to those that "have arisen from ain injury or
occupational disease sustained by that claimant" or as a result of forced sexual conduct).
50. E.g., Lockwood v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 926-27 (Minn. 1981)
(declining to construe Minnesota's statute as allowing compensability for mental mental injuries).
5 1. See statutes cited supra note 49.
52.

See Lockwood. 312 N.W.2d at 926-27.

53. Id. at 927.
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legislature.5 Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the workers'
compensation statute in that state was written so as to exclude mental-mental
injuries from the scope of the statute entirely.5 5 The court reasoned that while
the claimant is denied recovery under the workers' compensation system for
such injuries, the employer is also denied immunity from liability.56 Other
courts have expressed concern for imposing liability on employers for mental
injuries that are perceived to be too "remote" from a work-related cause.
D.

The Causal Relation Requirement

The final approach-the causal relation requirement-encompasses several
different causal standards, but the primary requirement is that the employee
shows that conditions of employment, in fact, caused the psychological injury.
In these states, any mental injury, including a mental-mental injury, is
theoretically compensable so long as the employee can demonstrate that
conditions of employment are a sufficient causative factor to meet the state's
standard.
Although the states that adhere to the causal relation requirement all allow
compensation for mental-mental injuries, the standards applied by each state
vary. For a time, the California courts interpreted the state's labor code as
allowing compensability for stress based on the employee's subjective
perception of the stress and not an objective evaluation of the workplace stress
placed on the employee.59 The result was a massive increase in the volume of
mental-mental claims filed in the succeeding years.60 The increased cost of
these claims led California to reform its compensation system to limit their
compensability.61 That reform required "an employee [to] demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were
predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury."'62 California
courts now construe their workers' compensation statute as requiring claimants
to demonstrate "that industrial factors account for more than 50 percent of the
employee's psychiatric injury."63

54. Id.
55. See Bunger v. Lawson Co., 696 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ohio 1998).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Superior Mill Work v. Gabel. 89 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 1956) (noting that the
causal connection between an injury and its cause "must not be remote" (quoting Thompson v. Ry.
Express Agency, 236 S.W.2d 36. 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951))).
58. See statutes cited supra note 47.
59. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 182 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308 (Ct. App.
1982), supersededby statute, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(b)(1) (West 2011), as recognized in Verga
v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 871, 878-79 (Ct. App. 2008).
60. See 3 LARSoN & LARSON. supra note 8. § 56.06[1][a].

61. Id.
62. CAL. LAB. CODE 3208.3(b)(1) (West 2011).
63. Verga, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467. 473 (Ct. App. 2004)).
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Michigan has long recognized mental-mental injuries, first by judicial
interpretation 64 and today by express statutory provision.6 5 The Michigan statute
appears to favor compensation in more cases than the California statute, allowing
compensation for mental injuries, including degenerative diseases, as long as
work conditions "contributed to or aggravated" the injury.66 Like the current
California statute, the Michigan legislature amended its workers' compensation
laws to require an objective standard for determining whether the workplace
stress was sufficient to cause the injury.6
The early Michigan cases suggest the primary rationale for the adoption of
the causal relation standard: "The injury to [the worker is] no less real and fatal
in its consequences than a mortal wound."68 This rationale is in accord with the
many provisions found in workers' compensation statutes requiring that the
entire scheme be construed in favor of compensation and the beneficent purposes
69
behind the scheme.
Implicit in this approach is a rejection of concerns
regarding the cost to industry and the difficulties of proving the causal
relationship between employment and injury.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE "EXTRAORDINARY OR UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES"
REQUIREMENT

When the South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the "extraordinary or
unusual circumstances" requirement in Stokes, it was rightfully regarded as a
step forward for employees suffering from psychological injuries: where once no
remedy was available for mental-mental injuries, a path to compensation had
been beaten.70 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the decision,7 1 and
the General Assembly added its approval in 1996 by codifying the
"extraordinary or unusual circumstances" requirement in the state's workers'
compensation law.72 However, two recent cases, Martinez v. Spartanburg

64. See Klein v. Len HT.Darling Co., 187 N.W. 400, 403 (Mich. 1922) (holding that the
state's workers' compensation statute permitted compensation for an employee who lapsed into
"delirium" and died when he dropped a radiator on the head of a fellow employee, mistakenly
believing that he had killed his co-worker).
65. MICH. COmP. LAws ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 2012).
66. Id.
67. See Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 641 N.W.2d 567, 573-74 (Mich. 2002) (citations
omitted) (discussing the progression of Michigan's workers' compensation laws in the area of
psychological injuries).
68. Klein. 187 N.W. at 408 (Wiest, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (LexisNexis 2007) ("[The act] shall be
liberally construed in favor of employees and the dependents of deceased employees.").
70. See Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.. 306 S.C. 311. 317-18. 411 S.E.2d 672, 675-76 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 22, 377 S.E.2d 922, 927 (Ct. App.
1988), af'd, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991)), affd in part,rev'd in part, 311 S.C. 218, 428
S.E.2d 700 (1993) (discussing the effect of the then-recent Stokes decision).
71. Stokes, 306 S.C. at 51, 410 S.E.2d at 251.
72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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-3
v. Spartanburg County,74 illustrate the limits of this
County and Bentley
approach and the challenges remaining for South Carolina workers who suffer
from psychological injuries.

4. Martinez v. Spartanburg County
Martinez involved the plight of Raquel Martinez, a forensic investigator and
twenty-eight-year law enforcement veteran.75 On April 4, 2005, Martinez was
called to the scene of an accident involving a friend and fellow law enforcement
officer. 6 The officer had accidentally struck and killed his two-year-old
daughter while backing out of his driveway.77 While on the scene, Martinez
performed all of her standard investigatory duties, including measuring the
child's body and taking photographs of the yard where the child lay. 8 The night
after the investigation, Martinez wept and experienced nightmares.'9 Martinez's
supervisor testified that "she was depressed, and within . . . three weeks, it

showed in her work, in her habits. 80 Four months after her work on the accident
scene, Martinez suffered a nervous breakdown, during which she mentioned to
her father that she wanted him "to meet an imaginary 'little girl.'" 8 1
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that Martinez's case was not
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act because she did not suffer
an '"unusual or extraordinary' condition in her particular employment."8 2 In so
doing, the court referred to a line of cases holding that "unusual or
extraordinary" working conditions were determined relative to the employee's
given line of work and not to working conditions of the general public.
The original case in this line of cases was Shealy v. Aiken County.84 In
Shealy, the South Carolina Supreme Court surveyed the laws and jurisprudence
of other states and identified three approaches to defining "extraordinary and
unusual": (1) compare the work conditions with those normally experienced in
the employee's day-to-day duties; (2) compare the work conditions with those
present in employment among the general population; and (3) compare the work

73. 394 S.C. 224, 715 S.E.2d 339 (Ct. App. 2011), reh'gdenied (Oct. 6, 2011), cert. granted

(Feb. 7, 2013).
74.
75.
76.
77.

398 S.C. 418, 730 S.E.2d 296 (2012). reh'g denied (Aug. 10, 2012).
Martinez, 394 S.C. at 227, 715 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 227-28. 715 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 227. 715 S.E.2d at 341.

78. Id
79. Id at 228, 715 S.E.2d at 341.
80. Id. at 229. 715 S.E.2d at 342.
81. Id. at 228. 715 S.E.2d at 341.

82. Id at 234, 715 S.E.2d at 344.
83. See id at 232-33, 715 S.E.2d at 344 (citing Frame v. Resort Servs. Inc., 357 S.C. 520,
529, 593 S.E.2d 491, 496 (Ct. App. 2004)).
84. 341 S.C. 448, 535 S.E.2d 438 (2000).
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conditions with the "wear and tear of [everyday] life."8 5 The supreme court
chose to adopt the first standard.86 In doing so, it relied exclusively on two
propositions. First, this standard is the same that the courts in South Carolina
have applied to heart attack cases for decades
echoing the reasoning the
Stokes court used when it adopted the "extraordinary or unusual circumstances"
test in the first place." Second, the supreme court quoted Professor Larson, who
noted that the "own normal working conditions" definition feels "the most
familiar."8
Notably absent from the court's decision in this portion of Shealy was any
analysis regarding the policy behind the adoption of this standard. 90 The court
made a token reference to the principle of liberal construction, but it provided
no discussion of the purposes of the workers' compensation statute. 92 In
particular, two purposes stand out as favoring a broader definition. First, as
noted previously, one reason workers' compensation exists is to protect workers
"from the various hardships that result from employment-related injuries."
Naturally, a definition that broadens coverage furthers this goal; additional
coverage would better protect employees from workplace risks.
Second, workers' compensation also exists to spread to industry the costs of
the risks it imposes on employees. 94 The Shealy court had a golden opportunity
to advance this goal by adopting a more inclusive definition of "unusual or
extraordinarv" circumstances. A broad definition would have shifted the burden
in high-stress industries, such as law enforcement, from the employee to the
employer, the latter of which is in a better position to bear the cost.9 5 Instead,
the Shealv court took the opposite approach, selecting the most restrictive
definition9 In addition to casting aside the opportunity to further two important

85.

Id at 457-58, 535 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 8,

§ 44.05(4)(d)(i) (1999)).

86. See id. at 458. 535 S.E.2d at 444.
87. See id. at 457. 535 S.E.2d at 443 (citing Powell v. Vulcan Materials Co., 299 S.C. 325,
327, 384 S.E.2d 725. 726 (1989), superseded by statute. S.C. CODE ANN. §42-1-160 (Supp. 2002),
as recognized in Frame, 357 S.C. 520, 593 S.E.2d 491).
88. See Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 22, 377 S.E.2d 922, 927 (Ct. App. 1988),
aff'd, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991).
89. Shealy, 341 S.C. at 458, 535 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 8,
§ 44.05(4)(d)(i) (1999)).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 455, 535 S.E.2d at 442 (citing Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 306 S.C. 311,
316, 411 S.E.2d 672, 674 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,311 S.C. 218. 428 S.E.2d 700
(1993)).
92. See id at 455-59, 535 S.E.2d at 442-44 (citations omitted).
93. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
94. See e.g., Taylor v. Mount Vernon-Woodberry Mills, 211 S.C. 414, 422. 45 S.E.2d 809.
812 (1947) ("The Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted . . . to protect industrial workers
against the hazards of their employment and to cast upon the industry in which they are employed a
share of the burden resulting from industrial accidents.").
95.

See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White. 243 U.S. 188, 203-204 (1917).

96.

See Shealy, 341 S.C. at 458. 535 S.E.2d at 444.
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policy goals, this decision effectively denied compensation for mental-mental
injuries to every employee involved in high-stress industries by setting the
standard of "unusual or extraordinary" unreachably high. The result is that the
employees who are most susceptible to job-related mental injuries are the least
able to meet the standard for compensability. Unfortunately for these workers,
the definition of "conditions of employment" applied in Shealy has been codified
in South Carolina's workers' compensation statute, precluding judicial
reconsideration of the issue.97
B. Bentley v. Spartanburg County
The second case is illustrative of the problem presented by the Shealy ruling.
In Bentley v. SpartanburgCounty,98 Officer Brandon Bentley was dispatched to
investigate an apparent dispute between neighbors.
Upon arriving on the
scene, Bentley encountered one of the men involved in the disturbance and asked
the man to come speak with him. 00 The man refused to do so and "exchanged
words" with Officer Bentley before approaching him with an umbrella raised in
an "offensive posture." 1o Bentley issued several commands to the man to cease
this action, but the man instead threatened to take Bentley's gun and kill him.102
Bentley then fired one shot at the man, killing him.103 In the weeks that
followed, Officer Bentley began suffering from "psychological symptoms
including anxiety and depression."104 Bentley sought treatment, and as a result,
his psychiatrist determined that he was unable to work. o0 The Workers'
Compensation Commission denied Bentley's compensation claim, o0 and on
review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.1o7 Because Bentley was a
trained police officer and, therefore, the shooting did not constitute an
"extraordinary or unusual" circumstance of his employment, the court ruled that
his injuries were noncompensable tinder the Act.108
In affirming, however, the court took the unusual step of offering its opinion
that the General Assembly should amend the workers' compensation statute to

97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160(B)(1) (Supp. 2012) (requiring the employee to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence "that the employee's employment conditions causing the stress,
mental injury, or mental illness were extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the normal
conditions of the particular employment").
98. 398 S.C. 418, 730 S.E.2d 296 (2012), reh'g denied (Aug. 10, 2012).
99. Id. at 420. 730 S.E.2d at 297.

100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id
Id.
Id. at 421. 730 S.E.2d at 297.
Id
Id at 421, 730 S.E.2d at 298.
Id. at 431. 730 S.E.2d at 303.
Id. at 430-31. 730 S.E.2d at 303.
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remove the "unusual and extraordinary circumstances" requirement.109 The
court argued that the traditional basis for denying compensability-fear of fraud
and falsification-was obsolete in light of continuing medical advances in the
fields of psychology and psychiatry and that the bright line rules favored in the
past were no longer necessary.' 1 The court pointed to the ability of several
states to operate successful workers' compensation systems without the
"extraordinary or unusual circumstances" requirement.II The court also noted
that claims for physical injury and pain and suffering were equally susceptible to
falsification, and that no justification remained for treating them differently than
psychological injuries. 112
V.

SEARCHING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE

Although the South Carolina Supreme Court requested a change to the law
concerning mental-mental injuries, the justices were vague about which
approach they favored. Recall the objectives of the workers' compensation
system identified by the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission:
[(1)] Provide sure. prompt, and reasonable income and medical benefits
to work-related accident victims, or income benefits to their dependents,
regardless of fault;
[(2)] Provide a single remedy and reduce court delays, costs, and
judicial workloads arising out of personal injury litigation;
[(3)] Relieve public and private charities of financial demands incident
to uncompensated occupational accidents;
[(4)] Minimize payment of fees to lawyers and witnesses as well as
time-consuming trials and court appeals;
[(5)] Encourage maximum employer interest in safety and rehabilitation
through an appropriate experience-rating mechanism; and

109. Id. at 423 25, 730 S.E.2d at 299 300 (citing Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d
813. 820 (Cal. 1980)).
110. See id. at 424. 730 S.E.2d at 299.
111. See id. at 426 & n.4, 730 S.E.2d at 300 & n.4 (naming Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey
New York, and Oregon (citing 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 8, § 56.06D[7])). However, aS
noted in Part 111.3-D, there are many others.
112. Id. at 424-25. 730 S.E.2d at 299-300 (citing Molien, 616 P.2d at 821).
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[(6)] Promote frank study of the causes of accidents (rather than
concealment of fault) in an effort to reduce preventable accidents and
human suffering.113
The "extraordinary or unusual circumstances" requirement thwarts the first,
third, and fifth goals by denying compensation for injuries that can clearly be
tied to workplace conditions and by freeing from liability employers that may be
in a position to reduce the risk of such injuries. On the other hand, this approach
does protect employers from the expense of litigation, albeit by barring
compensation for these injuries entirely.
Using the original purpose and goals of workers' compensation statutes as a
guide, this Part compares the approaches used in other states to see what changes
might improve South Carolina's law.
4. The Sudden Stimulus Requirement
Of the three approaches that South Carolina might adopt, the sudden
stimulus requirement is perhaps the most similar in terms of its overall effect on
compensability. Like the "extraordinary or unusual circumstances" requirement,
it occupies the middle ground between the restrictive physical injury causation
requirement and the generous causal relation requirement. Nonetheless, it is not
an ideal model for change because it still excludes a substantial portion of
mental-mental injuries-those that cannot be "trace[d] to a definite time, place,
and cause" are excluded.14 Indeed, under this test, even the employee in Stokes
who received compensation would be denied because an extended period of
stressful working conditions caused his injury.115 Therefore, adopting this
approach would merely shift the parameters of compensability, creating new
protections for workers injured in one fashion and removing protections for
those injured in a different fashion. This result is a clear failure to "[p]rovide
sure, prompt, and reasonable ... benefits to work-related accident victims," or to
"[r]elieve ... charities of financial demands incident to uncompensated
occupational accidents."ll6 By denying compensation entirely for these workrelated injuries, this approach places the costs squarely on the employee and any
charities. This method also fails to "[e]ncourage maximum employer interest in
safety and rehabilitation" or to "[p]romote frank study of the causes of
accidents"' 17 because it does not impose any liability on employers for the
psychological injuries that stressful, long-term working conditions cause. If

113. ANN. REP., supra note 16, at 1.
114. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. 1979).
115. See Stokes v. First Nat'I Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 15-16. 377 S.E.2d 922, 923 24 (Ct. App.
1988), affd, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991).
116. See supra notes 16, 113 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 16, 113 and accompanying text.
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employers suffer no liability, even under the generous workers' compensation
statute, what incentive do they have to change the conditions?
Because the sudden stimulus requirement is a rule of compensability and not
a fundamental change to the structure or procedure of workers' compensation,
the remaining objectives-exclusivity of remedy and minimization of costs of
traditional litigation 1 8-would be unaffected by a change to this approach.
B.

The Physical Ijury CausationRequirement

The physical injury causation requirement
is an even worse model for
change than the sudden stimulus requirement for the same reasons: (1) it imposes
the costs of work-related injuries on the employee and charity, rather than on the
employer; and (2) it fails to encourage employers to take an interest in employee
safety or to engage in a frank study of the causes of injury because it does not
impose liability for the consequences of injurious workplace conditions.120
Moreover, because the physical injury causation requirement denies
compensability entirely, it exacerbates the problem by denying protection and
refusing to impose liability on the entire class of workers suffering mentalmental injuries, not just a portion thereof.
C. The CausalRelation Requirement
The causal relation requirement is the ideal model for change because it does
a better job of furthering the objectives of workers' compensation. By providing
compensation to all employees who can demonstrate that workplace conditions
were the predominant cause of their psychological injury, the requirement
provides protection for all workers injured by workplace conditions without
discriminating between causes of injury. In adopting this requirement, the
system would relieve charities of the financial burden of caring for individuals
with psychological injuries caused by workplace conditions. This approach
would also improve workplace conditions, generally, by imposing the costs of
the risks of such conditions on employers, who will have a financial incentive to
keep psychological, as well as physical, injuries to a minimum.
Although the causal relation requirement is the preferred approach, it is not
perfect. As the South Carolina Supreme Court noted in Bentley, taking too
expansive an approach to compensability "could indeed unintentionally unleash
a flood of litigation that raises costs, burdens the courts, and unduly interferes

118. See supra notes 16, 113 and accompanying text.
119. As previously noted, the physical injury causation requirement requires claimants to
demonstrate that their psychological injuries arise from a physical injury to the body. See statutes
cited supra note 49.
120. See supra notes 16, 113 and accompanying text.
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with the hiring and firing of workers," as took place in California.'12
The
language of the requirement must be carefully crafted. By including an objective
standard for determining the stressfulness of workplace conditions and a
requirement that employees show that workplace conditions were the primary or
predominant cause of the injury, the system can compensate the injuries fairly
without subjecting itself to a deluge of frivolous claims.
VI. PATHS TO CHANGE

Because the General Assembly has codified both the Stokes and Shealy
holdings,122 most workers in South Carolina seeking compensation for mentalmental injuries will need legislative action to relieve their situations. A small
number of workers, whose injuries are the result of intentional or negligent torts,
should still be able to pursue relief because their injuries do not fall under the
exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.
A.

Legislative Action

Legislative action is necessary to change the statute and move South
Carolina toward the causal relation requirement. Although South Carolina's
"extraordinary or unusual circumstances" rule was first adopted by the judiciary,
it has since been codified by the General Assembly.
As the supreme court
noted in its call for reform in Bentley. the courts are now "bound by the language
of section 42-1-160 as written."l 2
Any permanent solution will depend on
legislative action.
In crafting language effecting this change, the General Assembly might
consider looking to other states that have adopted some version of the causal
relation requirement. The versions of the test codified in California and
Michigan provide two good models for statutory language.
In California, "[i]n order to establish that a psychiatric injury is
compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of

121. Bentley v. Spartanburg Cnty., 398 S.C. 418, 425 1.3, 730 SE.2d 296, 300 n.3 (2012)
(citing 3 LARsON& LARsoN, supranote 8. § 56.06[1][a]), reh'gdenied (Aug. 10, 2012).
122. Recall that Stokes, which articulated the "extraordinary or unusual circumstances"
requirement, was codified into the Workers' Compensation Act by 1996 S.C. Acts 2566 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (Supp. 2012)). Similarly. Shealy, which further interpreted
"extraordinary or unusual" as referring to the conditions of the employee's particular employment,
rather than the working public at large, was codified in 2007 S.C. Acts 610-11 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (Supp. 2012)).
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124. Bentley, 398 S.C. at 426, 730 S.E.2d at 301 (citing Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C.
190, 204, 133 S.E. 709, 713 (1925)).
125. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(b)(1) (West 2011); MICH. COMNiP. LAwS ANN. § 418.301 (West
Supp. 2012).
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the psychiatric injury."126 Under this statute, compensation "may be awarded
only when industrial factors account for more than 50 percent of a psychiatric
disability."127 This language was adopted in "response to increased public
concern about the high cost of workers' compensation coverage, limited benefits
for injured workers, suspected fraud and widespread abuses in the system,"12
and its effect is "to impose a significantly higher quantum of proof to establish
that a psychiatric injury is compensable."129 This underlying policy makes the
language suitable, perhaps ideal, for addressing the concerns that led to the
adoption of the current requirement in South Carolina., while still expanding
compensability to include all workers suffering psychological injuries caused by
workplace conditions.
Michigan's statute provides a slightly more generous standard: "[m]ental
disabilities are compensable if arising out of actual events of employment, not
unfounded perceptions thereof, and if the employee's perception of the actual
events is reasonably grounded in fact or reality."1 0 All injuries under the
Michigan statute, not just psychological injuries, are compensable "if work
causes, contributes to, or aggravates pathology in a manner so as to create a
pathology that is medically distinguishable from any pathology that existed prior
to the injury." 13 No "50 percent" requirementl32 is imposed.
While either standard would achieve the objectives of the workers'
compensation system discussed above, the California standard seems more likely
to be enacted from both a political and a practical perspective. Because the
California standard is more restrictive, it is less susceptible to attack from
arguments that it will open the floodgates to frivolous psychological-injury
claims. Additionally, because the existing language was enacted in direct
response to exactly such a deluge and because it appears to have resolved the
issue in California, advocates can point to that success in recommending the
language.
The language also charges claimants with proving that work
conditions really were the primary cause of their psychological injury and not
just an excuse to file a workers' compensation claim. This charge should further
alleviate fears that any amendment would "open the floodgates" to fraudulent
claims.
Although legislative action is the best and most permanent solution, it is also
the most difficult to achieve and the most time consuming to initiate. Until such
action is taken, some relief is available to employees whose circumstances

126. LAB. § 3208.3(b)(1).
127. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 472 (Ct App.
2004) (citing Dep't of Corr. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 720 (Ct. App.
1999)).
128. Id. (quoting Hansen v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 33 (Ct. App.
1993)).
[29. Id.
130. MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 2012).
131. Id. §418.301(1).
132. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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4 Practical Solution

Despite the supreme court's call to action, legislative deliberation takes
time. 133 Any statutory amendment that would replace the "extraordinary or
unusual circumstances" requirement is, therefore, unlikely to occur in the near
future. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, an employee who suffers a
mental-mental injury that is not caused by "extraordinary or unusual" conditions
of employment may be able to sustain a cause of action by avoiding the workers'
compensation system entirely. Instead of filing a workers' compensation claim,
employees may, under certain circumstances, instead be able to seek a remedy
by pursuing a traditional cause of action in tort. Specifically, actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence should both be exempt
from the exclusive-remedy provision, under the right circumstances.
1. IntentionalInfliction ofEmotional Distress
Ordinarily, the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by employees while
on the job is a workers' compensation claim. 4 However, South Carolina has
recognized an exception to this provision in cases where a fellow employee or
employer intentionally caused the injury to the employee. In the first case
recognizing the exception, Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co.,
the South
Carolina Supreme Court heard the case of a minor, whose manager slapped her
face while they both worked in the defendant's store.
In rejecting the
employer's argument that Stewart's exclusive remedy was the Workers'
Compensation Act, the court explained that "[t]o say that an intentional and
malicious assault and battery by an employer on an employee is such an accident
is a travesty on the use of the English lan uage." 137
Furthermore, in McSwain v. Shei,
the South Carolina Supreme Court
expressly included intentional infliction of emotional distress in the list of torts
excepted from the exclusive-remedy provision.139 In that case, the court

133. For example, notice the delay between the 1988 decision in Stokes and the General
Assembly's codification ofthat case's holding in 1996. See supra Part III.A.
134. See, e.g., Edens v. Bellini. 359 S.C. 433, 441, 597 S.E.2d 863, 867 (Ct. App. 2004)
(citing Fuller v. Blanchard, 358 S.C. 536, 540, 595 S.E.2d 831. 833 (Ct. App. 2004)) ("The
Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy against ain employer for ain employee's workrelated accident or injury.").
135. 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
136. Id. at 51-52, 9 S.E.2d at 35.
137. Id. at 55, 9 S.E.2d at 37.
138. 304 S.C. 25, 402 S.E.2d 890 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Sabb v. S.C. State

Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 567 S.E.2d 231 (2002).
139. Id. at 30, 402 S.E.2d 893.
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considered the case of an employee, Marie McSwain, who suffered from a
bladder condition that required surgery.140 The employer knew that Marie had
this condition and was aware that she was not supposed to engage in strenuous
exercises.141 Nonetheless, the employer demanded that Marie engage in daily
exercises or be fired.142 Because of the resulting humiliation, Marie filed suit
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.14 The employer responded,
inter alia, by moving for summary judgment on the basis of the exclusiveremedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. 144 In affirming the lower
court's denial of the motion, the supreme court recognized that intentional
infliction of emotional distress should be included among the torts excepted from
the exclusive-remedy provision. 145 The court reasoned that "the compensation
laws were [not] enacted to protect an employer where he deliberately and
intentionally inflicts . . . outrageous actions upon an employee to cause him

emotional distress."i 46
While McSwain is useful to employees injured by the intentional infliction
of emotional distress, it does little to help employees who stiffer mental-mental
injuries that do not rise to the level of "extraordinary or unusual" circumstances
or go beyond "all possible bounds of decency." '14 What can be done for these
employees? The answer lies with the definition of "injury" as it is used in the
statute.
2.

Noncompensable Psychological Injuries Are Not "Injuries"

Because the "extraordinary or unusual circumstances" requirement is used to
determine whether a claimant has suffered an "injury" tinder the Workers'
Compensation Act, any mental-mental injury a claimant suffers is not an
"injury" for the purposes of the Act unless it was caused by "extraordinary and
unusual" circumstances of employment.148 In other words, as far as the
Workers' Compensation Act is concerned, an employee who suffers a mentalmental injury absent "extraordinary or unusual" conditions never suffered an
"injury" at all. This distinction is important because the exclusive-remedy
provision applies to employees' rights that become applicable "on account of
personal injury or death by accident." 1 9 Thus, if the Act does not recognize that

140. Id. at 27. 402 S.E.2d at 891.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 27. 402 S.E.2d at 890.
144. Id. at 27. 402 S.E.2d at 891.
145. Id. at 29, 402 S.E.2d at 892.
146. Id. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at 892.
147. See id. at 28, 402 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting Ford v. Iutson, 276 S.C. 157, 162, 276 S.E.2d
776, 778 (1981)).
148. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160(B)(1) (Supp. 2012).
149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (1976).
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an "injury" has occurred, such a "non-injury" cannot be subject to the exclusiveremedy provision.
Although this argument has yet to be raised in South Carolina., it is not a
unique position on the national level. In Bunger v. Lawson Co.,1so the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that Ohio's workers' compensation statute, which contains
a restriction similar to South Carolina's on mental-mental injuries in its
definition of the term "injury,"si was not the proper remedy for a worker who
suffered a mental-mental injury. 1
The plaintiff, Rachel Bunger, was a
convenience store employee who suffered symptoms of post-traumatic stress
15^
disorder after surviving a robbery during her shift. 1
Bunger filed both a
workers' compensation claim and a tort claim for negligence against her
employer.154 The trial court dismissed both actions, ruling that the workers'
compensation claim did not result from an "injury" under the statute, rendering
the claim noncompensable, and that the employer was immune from the tort
claim under the exclusive-remedy provision of the statute.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the tort claim, reasoning

that "[i]f a psychological injury is not an injury according to the statutory
definition of 'injury,' then it is not among the class of injuries from which
employers are immune from suit."1 5 6 The court detennined that any other
holding would be "nonsensical," "unfair," "absurd," and would work upon
employees a "Catch-22." 1'
The court also chastised the lower courts by
referencing the bargain between employers and employees that underlies the
workers' compensation system: "The lower court decisions remove
psychological injuries from the tradeoff between employers and employeesemployees relinquish their common-law remedies for psychological injuries in
return for nothini. That [result] is antithetical to the philosophical underpinnings
of the system."
The exceptions to the exclusive-remedy provision outlined above, while
hopefully useful to some injured workers, are limited to situations in which a
cognizable tort action against an employer will lie.159 As the Ohio Supreme
Court noted in Bunger, "the common law itself does not leave much room for
recovery for purely psychological injuries."160 Because the class of injured
workers who can take advantage of the exceptions is so small, any action taken

150. 696 N.E.2d 1029 (Ohio 1998).
151. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).

152. Bunger, 696 N.E.2d at 1031.
153. Id at 1030.

154. Id
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1030-31.
Id. at 1031.
Id
Id at 1032.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-37. 145-46. 156-58.
Bunger, 696 N.E.2d at 1032.
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utilizing them will be limited. Therefore, legislative action is still imperative to
remedy this issue.
VII.CONCLUSION
South Carolina's rules for compensability for psychological injuries are
broken. They reflect an outdated understanding of medical science and a
hesitance to tackle what are, at times, tricky evidentiary issues. Because of these
failures, the system currently does not adequately address the needs of South
Carolinians nor does it fully achieve the objectives of all workers' compensation
systems. Nevertheless, the situation is not hopeless. Other states have adopted
successful measures that protect workers while still preserving the integrity of
the system for employers. The models are there, and the South Carolina
Supreme Court has issued the call. It is time to make a change for South
Carolina's workers.
JordanMichael Janoski
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